Introduction to the Report
Corruption and Development in the Philippines?
Rationale of Whistleblowing Against Corruption
Rationale of Legislative Proposal to Encourage Whistleblowing
Review of Literature on Whistleblowing
Whistleblowing Practices Across Selected Countries
Diagnosis of Whistleblowing in the Philippines
Key Features of Pending Bills on Whistleblowing in the Philippines
Whistleblowing Policy and Implementation Package
Towards a Positive Whistleblowing Culture Against Corruption
Documentation Reports with Key Imformants
Detailed Responses to Interview Questions
Preceedings of the Whistleblowing Policy Planning Workshop
Keynote Address on Justice Feliciano
Stakeholders' Awareness, Attitudes and Concerns Regarding Whistleblowing
Aha! the Whistleblowers and Tipsters' Project
Spirituality of Whistleblowing
PLDT Groups Extended Whistleblowing Policy
Comparative Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies in other Countries
The Proposed Whistleblower's Protection Act
Highlights of the Whistleblowing Policy Planning Workshop
Whistleblowing as an Anti-Corruption Tool
Essential Elements of Whistleblowing Policy
Highlights of the Videoconference
Whistleblowing
Practices Across Selected Countries
The
succeeding discussions have two parts. Part 1 is a case study of two
laws in Australia. It is primarily intended to familiarize
policymakers and researchers on the structure, elements, and
substantive provisions of a sample legislation primarily designed to
encourage whistleblowing against corruption. Part 2 is a comparative
analysis of the key features of whistleblowing laws of six countries
(Australia, Japan, South Korean, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United
States). It aims to widen the knowledge base related to approaches to
promote whistleblowing.
2.2.1 Case
Study on the WPA of 2001 of Victoria, Australia
Structure
of the Victorian whistleblowing legislation. Victoria has one of
the most recent and comprehensive laws on whistleblowing. Several
elements can be identified from a closer examination of this sample
law (see also Table 14 for details), to wit:
Purposes
of the policy;
Definition
and scope of a protected disclosure;
Whistleblower's
protection;
Whistleblowing
channels and procedures;
Support
structures for, and programs to promote, whistleblowing;
Safeguards
against false disclosures.
Table
14
Structure
of Victorian Whistleblowing Legislation
|
MAJOR
SECTIONS
|
KEY
PROVISIONS
|
|
Purposes
|
by
public officers and public bodies;
disclosures
and those who suffer reprisals in relation to those disclosures;
|
|
Definition
of terms
|
|
|
Who
can make a disclosure about an improper conduct?
|
a
natural person who believes on reasonable grounds that a public
officer or public body-(a) has engaged, is engaging or
proposes to engage in improper conduct in their capacity as a
public officer or public body; or (b) has taken, is taking or
proposes to take detrimental action in contravention of section
18
|
|
To
whom can a disclosure be made?
|
Ombudsman
(when the disclosures relates to a member of municipal council,
the Chief Commissioner of Police, or members of the police
force)
Public
body (when the disclosure relates to a member, officer, or
employee of a public body)
President
of the Legislative Council (when the disclosure relates to
member of this council)
Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly (when the disclosure is about a
Member of Parliament)
Director
of Police Integrity (when the disclosure relates to the Chief
Police Commissioner and the members of the police force)
|
|
Form
and manner of making a disclosure
|
|
|
Protection
of whistleblowers
|
Immunity
from criminal, civil or administrative liability
No
breach of duty of maintain confidentiality
Protection
from defamation suits
Imprisonment
for those who retaliate against whistleblowers
Definition
of various acts of reprisals
Right
to initiate proceedings for damages for reprisal
Right
to apply for injunction or order before the Supreme Court
Legal
offense to reveal confidential information about the
whistleblower
|
|
Determination
of public interest disclosures by the Ombudsman
|
Ombudsman
must determine within reasonable time if a disclosure is a
public interest disclosure
Ombudsman
must be satisfied that the disclosure shows or tends to show
that a public officer or public body (a) has engaged, is
engaging or proposes to engage in improper conduct in their
capacity as a public officer or public body; or (b) has taken,
is taking or proposes to take detrimental action in
contravention of the Act;
Notice
of determination to be sent to the whistleblower
Notice
of alternative procedure if the disclosure is not a public
interest disclosure and it can qualify as a complaint under the
Ombudsman Act of 19 73
|
|
Disclosures
made to public bodies
|
Public
body must determine within 45 days if the disclosure is a public
interest disclosure or not
Public
body to notify the whistleblower within 14 days of its
conclusion that a disclosure is public interest disclosure
Public
body refers the disclosure to the Ombudsman for determination
whether it is a public interest disclosure
Public
body not required to notify anonymous whistleblower
|
|
Disclosures
in relation to the members of the police form
|
Consideration
whether a disclosure is a public interest disclosure
Request
for referral to Ombudsman;
Determination
by the Ombudsman
|
|
Investigation
of public interest disclosures by the Ombudsman
|
-
to investigate matters disclosed in public interest disclosures
-
to prepare and publish guidelines for the procedures to be
followed
by
public bodies
-
to monitor investigations by the Chief Commissioner of Police
-
to monitor investigations by public bodies
-
to review the procedures and the implementation of procedures of
public
bodies
Trivial,
frivolous matters need not be investigated by Ombudsman
Referral
of public interest disclosures to a public body for
investigation
Notice
of referral to whistleblower; if anonymous not required to
notify
|
|
Investigation
by Ombudsman
|
Procedures
for investigation
Notice
of investigation
Investigation
to be conducted in private
Hearing
is not required
Ombudsman
determines whether any person would need legal representation
Deliberations
of Ministers and Parliamentary committees not to be disclosed
Power
to enter premises
Opportunity
to be heard before adverse report
-
|
|
Action
on completion of investigation
|
Director
may report to Ombudsman
Report
on investigation
Notice
of implementation of recommendation
Report
to Parliament
Person
who made disclosure to be informed
|
|
Investigation
of public interest disclosures by public bodies
|
public
body to establish procedures
Ombudsman's
guidelines
Availability
of procedures
Review
of procedures
Requirement
to investigate
Referral
to Ombudsman by public body
Ombudsman
may take over an investigation
Notice
of referral
Investigation
to be in accordance with procedures
Information
about progress of investigation
Action
on investigation
|
|
Investigation
of public interest disclosures referred to Chief Commissioner of
Police
|
Requirement
to investigate
Request
to Ombudsman by person making the disclosure
Ombudsman
can take over the investigation
Power
to require answers of members of the policy force in certain
investigations
Progress
reports to Ombudsman on investigations
Disagreement
between Ombudsman and the Chief of Police on the implementation
of recommendations
|
|
Investigation
of disclosures about Members of Parliament
|
Referral
of disclosure to Ombudsman
Determination
of a disclosure as a public interest disclosure
Notice
of determination
Investigation
by Ombudsman for every public interest disclosure
Report
on investigation to the President of the Legislative Council or
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
|
|
Annual
reports and other reports
|
-current
whistleblowing guidelines
-
number and types of disclosures made to the Ombudsman during
the
year
-
the number and type of determinations made by the Ombudsman
during
the year as to whether disclosures are public interest
disclosures
-
number and types of disclosed matters investigated during the
year
-
number and types of disclosed matters referred to the Chief
Commissioner
of Police, the Auditor-General, a prescribed public
Body
or the holder of a prescribed office to investigate;
|
|
Oversight
by special investigations monitor
|
Director
of Police Integrity must report summonses to Special
Investigations Monitor
Complaints
to Special Investigations Monitor
Special
Investigations Monitor may refuse to investigate complaints
Investigation
of complaints
Requirement
to provide assistance
Powers
of entry and access
Requirements
to answer questions and produce documents
Annual
and other reports by Special Investigations Monitor
|
|
General
provisions
|
Offense
to make a false disclosure; two (2) years imprisonment
Immunity
from civil or criminal proceedings of the Ombudsman and others
for performing their duties under the Act
Protection
of legal practitioners and witnesses
Exemption
from Freedom of Information Act of 1982
Supreme
Court-limitation of jurisdiction
Service
on a person making a disclosure (in writing, personally or by
post)
Transitional
provision on the creation of office of Police Ombudsman
|
Purposes
of the policy. The policy aims to encourage any person to blow
the whistle against improper conduct of public officers and public
bodies/organizations. To encourage whistleblowing, it provides
protection to whistleblowers and other persons who would suffer
retaliation for making a public-interest disclosure. It also mandates
the Ombudsman or appropriate public bodies to investigate all
public-interest disclosures.
Definitions.
The legislation contains definitions of important terms such as
"corrupt conduct", "detrimental action", "public body",
"public officer", "relevant Minister", etc. It also contains
provisions excluding certain persons or bodies from the coverage of
the law.
Whistleblower.
It defines a whistleblower as any "natural person" who can make a
disclosure about an improper conduct committed by a public officer or
public body. The whistleblower has to show in his/her disclosure that
the public officer or public body "has engaged, is engaging or
proposes to engage in improper conduct" or "has taken, is taking
or proposed to take detrimental action".
Whistleblower's
protection. The law establishes several mechanisms to protect
whistleblowers. It provides for the legal immunity of a whistleblower
from criminal, civil or administrative actions or defamation suits.
It also assures that no breach of legal or professional requirement
for maintaining confidentiality occurs when one makes a
public-interest disclosure. It also provides 1) legal remedies for
retaliatory actions in the workplace, 2) defines acts of reprisals
and makes them an offense punishable by not more than two-year
imprisonment, and 3) gives whistleblowers the right to apply for an
injunction before the Supreme Court to stop a reprisal. It also
treats as offense acts of persons that reveal the whistleblower and
the subject of his/her public-interest disclosures.
Whistleblowing
channels. For a disclosure to be treated as a public-interest
disclosure, it must go through appropriate channels. In the Victorian
statute, a whistleblower has to report corrupt or improper conduct of
a member of a Municipal Council, the Chief Commissioner of Police,
and the members of the police force to the Ombudsman. When the
disclosure relates to a member, officer, or employee of a public
body, it must be reported to that public body. The statute also
covers politicians. When a certain disclosure relates to a member of
a Legislative Council, it must be reported to the President of that
Council. When a disclosure involved a wrongdoing by a Member of
Parliament (MP), it must be disclosed to the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly.
Form
of disclosure. Disclosures can be done orally or in writing. They
must also follow the prescribed procedure for making a
public-interest disclosure. Anonymous disclosure is allowed, with
certain disadvantages. For example, the law does not require the
Ombudsman to notify an anonymous whistleblower regarding the
Ombudsman's actions in relation to his or her disclosures.
Handling
disclosures. The law requires the Ombudsman and other public
bodies to determine within a reasonable period of time whether a
disclosure qualifies as a "public-interest disclosure". For the
Ombudsman, the law does not set specific time frames. For public
bodies, however, the law requires only 14 from its determination that
a disclosure is a protected one to notify the whistleblower.
Support
structures. The whistleblowing law treats the Ombudsman as a very
important support structure for policy implementation. It mandates
the performance of certain responsibilities
of support structures. For example, it requires the Ombudsman to
investigate all public-interest disclosures. It also mandates the
Ombudsman to prepare guidelines to be followed by all public bodies
in their handling of public-interest disclosures. It is required to
monitor the public bodies' implementation of whistleblowing
procedures as well as monitor progress of investigations conducted by
public bodies and the Chief Commissioner of Police. There are
exceptions to the Ombudsman's duty to investigate disclosures.
Among these are disclosures that are considered as "trivial" and
"frivolous". Other public organizations are also treated as
support structures.
Support
programs. The Victorian statute requires the Ombudsman and public
bodies to give annual reports to Congress on the implementation of
the whistleblowing policy. The annual report must contain the current
whistleblowing guidelines; the number and types of disclosures made
to the Ombudsman during the year; the number and type of
determinations made by the Ombudsman; the number and types of
disclosed matters investigated and referred to public bodies, the
Chief Commissioner of Police, and the Auditor-General.
Case
study on the Whistleblower's Protection Act of 1994 of
Queensland
Queensland
became one of the first state governments in Australia to adopt a
whistleblowing legislation (Groeneweg 2001). Its Whistleblowers
Protection Act (WPA) of 1994 emerged as the political system'ss
response to the massive corruption in the Queensland public service
in the late 1980s up to the 1990s.
Purpose.
The statute aims to "promote the public interest by protecting
persons who disclose unlawful, negligent or improper conduct
affecting the public sector; danger to public health or safety; and
danger to the environment".
Protected
disclosures. The statute gives special protection to disclosures
about unlawful, negligent, or improper public sector conduct or
danger to public health or safety of the environment.
Since the protections are very broad, the law contains a number of
balancing mechanisms designed to focus the protection where it is
needed and make it easier to decide whether the special protection
applies to a disclosure. The whistleblowing policy also ensures
appropriate consideration is given to the interests of persons
accused in the disclosures.
Like
in Victorian model, the protection extends to a "public-interest
disclosure", which is special type of disclosure defined in terms
of the 1) the person making the disclosure, 2) the type of
information disclosed, and 3) the appropriate entity to which the
disclosure is made.
Whistleblower's
protection. Unlike in the Victorian model, however, the
Queensland scheme distinguishes between two types of whistleblowers:
public officers and anybody. To be entitled to protection, public
officers must make disclosures relating to official misconduct,
maladministration, or matters that involve danger to public health or
the environment.
The
legislation focuses on protecting "public-interest disclosures"
than solely on the person making the disclosure. Nevertheless, the
person making such "public-interest disclosure" enjoys certain
rights and protection. For example, under Part 5, Division 2 of the
statute, a whistleblower making a public interest disclosure has
legal immunity from criminal, civil or administrative cases. Part 5,
Divisions 3 to 5 of the law makes it unlawful to cause, attempt or
conspire to cause detriment to any person who has made a
"public-interest disclosure". Such actions are declared as
reprisals, which are considered unlawful under civil and criminal
laws.
Part
5, division 6, of the statute requires public sector entities to
establish reasonable procedures to protect their officers from
reprisals. Public officers who have existing rights to appeal
against, or to apply for a review of, disciplinary actions,
appointments, transfers or unfair treatment, can use these rights
against reprisals.
The
law emphasizes the need to preserve the confidentiality of the
whistleblower's identity and subject matter of his disclosure. It
penalizes any public officer who record or disclose confidential
information acquired through involvement in the law's
implementation.
Whistleblowing
procedures and channels. Under Part 4, Division 2 of the
statute, a public interest disclosure must be made before an
appropriate public sector entity or persons. This requirement,
according to the Act's general explanations, ensures that "public
interest disclosures are made to the public sector entities that have
responsibility or power to take appropriate action about the
information disclosed or to provide an appropriate remedy". In
addition, it also ensures that "unfair damage is not caused to the
reputations of persons against whom disclosures are made by
inappropriate publication of unsubstantiated disclosures".
The
appropriate entities need to keep proper records about
"public-interest disclosures". This is because of the statutory
requirement for public bodies to submit an annual report to the
legislature containing information on the disclosures received and
official actions undertaken to address them.
The
statute also requires appropriate entities to notify the
whistleblower about the actions taken on their disclosure and the
results of such actions.
Support
structures. Public service employees enjoy an additional right to
request the Public Service Commissioner for work transfer to remove
any danger of reprisals. The Industrial Commission or the Supreme
Court can grant injunctions against cases of reprisals against
whistleblowers.
Safeguards
against false allegations. To encourage genuine whistleblowing,
the statute declares it as an offense for any person to intentionally
give false or misleading information as a "public-interest
disclosure".
2.2.3
Comparative analysis of the purposes of whistleblowing legislation
Table
15 below shows that a common purpose of whistleblowing legislation is
to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and any disadvantageous
treatment. In principle, these laws acknowledge the value of
whistleblowers in promoting the public interest, protecting the
integrity of the public service, and preventing wrongdoings in
government.
Table
15
Purposes
of whistleblowing legislation across countries
(Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States)
|
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
UK
|
US
|
|
To
promote the public interest
|

|
|

|

|
|
|
|
To
improve the public service
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
To
prevent and eliminate wrongdoing in public and private sector
organizations
|
|

|
|
|
|

|
|
To
promote compliance with laws
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To
encourage, facilitate disclosures of wrongdoing; create a culture
which will facilitate the disclosure of irregular conduct in the
workplace
|
|
|

|

|
|
|
|
To
provide procedures for whistleblowing; provide guidelines for the
disclosure of information about wrongdoing
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
To
protect whistleblowers
|

|

|

|

|

|

|
|
To
mandate organizational action on whistleblowing
|

|
|

|

|
|
|
Reference
documents: Japan's Whistleblower's Protection Act; South Korea's
Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 Amended by Act No.7612 on July 21, 2005 ;
Whistleblower's Protection Act of 2001 of Victoria, Australia and
the Whistleblower's Protection Act of 1994 of Queensland,
Australia; New Zealand Protected Disclosures Act of 2000; United
Kingdom's Public Interest Disclosures Act of 1998; United States
Whistleblower's Protection Act of 1989;
Whistleblower's
protection and mandating state action are two common themes of the
academic literature that are also stamped in whistleblowing
legislation. The establishment of support structures and procedures
is also prominent as a purpose.
Higher
goals inspire the purposes of these laws. For example, in Japan,
Australia and New Zealand, the whistleblowing laws are directed
towards the goal of promoting the public interest. In South Korea and
the United States, the whistleblowing laws are designed to prevent
and eliminate wrongdoings in the public sector.
Whistleblowing
laws in Australia and New Zealand aim to facilitate disclosures of
wrongdoing by creating new organizational cultures that make it
easier for employees to blow the whistle against observed
wrongdoings.
South
Korea's whistleblowing legislation, the Anti-Corruption Act of
2001, creates a mechanism for reporting disclosures and protecting
the persons making the disclosure from retaliatory actions. In
general, its aims are to rid the civil service and society of
corruption. It prohibits certain forms of wrongdoing and provides a
Code of Conduct for Public Officials. Mandating whistleblowing as a
duty of public officials, it also aims to promote honor and integrity
in the public service.
2.2.4
Comparative analysis of protected disclosures
The
core of any whistleblowing legislation is the definition and scope of
"protected disclosures". The review of whistleblowing laws
reveals that the concept of protected disclosure varies from country
to country. Table 16 provides a comparative analysis of the statutory
provisions on protected disclosures.
Table
16
Definition
and scope of protected whistleblowing
(Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States)
|
Elements
of the definition
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
UK
|
US
|
|
Whistleblower
|
|
A
worker, an employee
|

|
|
|

|

|
|
|
public
officers and employees
|

|

|

|

|

|

|
|
any
person
|
|

|

|
|
|
|
|
Subject
|
|
acts
that endanger people's lives or health or endanger the
environment
|

|
|

|

|

|

|
|
acts
that damage fair economic competition
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public
officer's conduct that amounts to breach of public trust;
public officer's misuse of information acquired in the course
of performance of his/her public functions; acts of dishonesty or
inappropriate partiality; abuses of position of authority for
self gain; official misconduct; violation of laws for self-gain;
information showing failure or continuing failure to comply with
legal obligations;
|
|

|

|

|
|

|
|
Any
person's act that adversely affect the honest performance of a
public officer's or a public body's functions; acts of
forcing, recommending, suggesting or encouraging someone to
engage in illegal and corrupt acts; knowingly directing or
counseling a person to commit a wrongdoing
|
|

|

|
|
|
|
|
Maladministration;
gross mismanagement in the public sector
|
|
|

|
|
|

|
|
illegal
acts causing financial damage to the government; unlawful,
negligent, or improper conduct affecting the public sector;
unlawful, corrupt, or irregular use of public funds or resource;
misuse of public resources or assets
|
|

|

|

|
|

|
|
Illegal
conduct (prior to the law's passage)
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
About
serious wrongdoing committed or by an organization
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
Information
showing that a criminal offense has been committed, is being
committed or is likely to be committed
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Information
showing that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring
or is likely to occur
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Exceptionally
serious failure
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Genuine
concerns about crime and civil offenses
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Other
qualifications and exceptions
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Employee's
reasonable belief that information is true or likely to be true
|
|
|
|

|

|
|
|
Immaterial
whether the relevant failure occurred, occurs or would occur in
the country or elsewhere
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Disclosure
made in good faith
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
disclosure
not for gaining illegal benefits
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
disclosure
not for causing damage to someone
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disclosure
not for attaining illegal objective
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Not
a subject of legal professional privilege
|
|
|

|

|

|
|
|
Not
a protected disclosure when someone commits an offense in making
it.
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Does
not cover the army or intelligence services; national security
exceptions
|
|
|
|
|

|

|
A
protected disclosure can be aimed at calling the attention of the
authorities on certain wrongdoings that need to be addressed. It is
also initiated out of the desire to have certain wrongdoings
investigated by the authorities. In some laws, a protected disclosure
is made in order to gain protection for certain disclosures of
observed wrongdoing.
There
are several elements of the various definitions of a protected
disclosure. The definitions are made with reference to the one who
reported the information (whistleblower), the subject of the
disclosure, and such other qualifications and exceptions that
function as safeguards against false testimonies. The other element,
which is discussed in detail in the succeeding section, is the
prescribed destination or route of the disclosure.
Whistleblower.
The whistleblower can be an employee of a public or private
organization. The whistleblower could also be a public official or
employee, which is the focus of some of the whistleblowing
legislation. Some laws encourage anyone to blow the whistle against a
wrongdoing.
Subject.
This is the most common aspect of a protected disclosure.
Basically, a protected disclosure enumerates the forms of wrongdoing,
which, when reported by a person, would entitle him or her to state
protection and support. Information concerning abuses of public power
for personal gain is a common scope of a protected disclosure in the
country legislation surveyed. Among the acts covered by a protected
disclosure are 1) acts of dishonesty; 2) public officer's action
that amount to breach of public trust; and 3) influencing another
public officer to commit a corrupt or illegal act. Individual and
organizational practices that endanger people's lives or damage the
environment are also covered in many definitions and scope of a
protected disclosure.
Some
definitions of protected disclosures focus on uncovering corruption.
For example, in South Korea's Anti-Corruption Act of 2001, the main
purpose of defining a protected disclosure is to uncover corrupt
activities in the public sector. As such, the definition of a
protected disclosure includes
Any
act causing damage to the property of any public entity in violation
of acts and acquiring, managing, or disposing the property of the
relevant public entity, or entering into and executing contract to
which the relevant public entity is a party.
The
whistleblower's reasonable belief of the existence of a wrongdoing
is adequate in determining a protected disclosure in some countries.
In the United States, for example, a "protected disclosure" is
the "disclosure of any information that an employee reasonably
believes evidences a violation of law, rule or regulation, a gross
waste of funds, gross mismanagement, an abuse of authority, or a
significant and specific danger to public health or safety". It is
significant to highlight that "a disclosure need not prove
ultimately accurate in order to be protected; it is enough that the
person making it is acting in good faith and with an objectively
reasonable belief in its accuracy".
In
the United Kingdom, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) of 1998
protects a broad range of disclosures. These include any disclosure
which, within the "reasonable belief" of the worker making it,
tends to show that a criminal offense is being, has been, or is
likely to be committed; that a person has failed, is failing, or is
likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which that
person is subject; that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is
occurring, or is likely to occur; that the health or safety or an
individual has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered; that
the environment has been, is being, or is likely to be deliberately
concealed.
Qualifications.
Certain qualifications and exceptions further clarify the concept
of a protected disclosure. In the whistleblowing laws surveyed,
reporting a wrongdoing in "good faith" is one of these
qualifications. Another is the whistleblower's reasonable belief
that the information disclosed is likely to be true. The positive
aspect of whistleblowing is also highlighted as a qualification of a
protected disclosure. In Japan, for example, a protected disclosure
must not be made to gain "illegal benefits", cause "damage to
someone", or to attain an "illegal objective". A matter subject
of a legal professional privilege is not considered a protected
disclosure in some Australian states, New Zealand, and United
Kingdom. Matters concerning national security or the military are
excluded from the scope of the whistleblowing legislation.
Safeguards.
Safeguards against false testimonies are not an inherent part of
the definition of a protected disclosure. However, they further
elucidate the concept of protected disclosure by highlighting
activities that do not deserve state protection. In Japan and
Australia, whistleblowers are required to make an effort not to
damage the legitimate interests of the public and others (Table 17).
Table
17 Safeguards from false and malicious whistleblowing
|
Safeguards
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
|
Whistleblowers
shall make effort not to damage the legitimate interests of
others and the interest of the public
|

|
|
|
|
|
Obligation
to report in good faith; a person who reports an act of
corruption despite the fact that s/he knew or could have known
that his/her report was false, shall not be protected by this Act
|
|

|
|
|
|
Two
years imprisonment for making the offense of false disclosure
|
|
|

|
|
|
Unfair
damage should not be caused to the reputations of persons against
whom disclosures are made by inappropriate publication of
unsubstantiated disclosures
|
|
|

|
|
|
No
protection for false allegations
|
|
|
|

|
In
South Korea, a whistleblower is obliged to report in good faith and
will be penalized for disclosing false information. To ensure
responsible whistleblowing, the Anti-Corruption Act imposes
punishments for whistleblowers making false claims. The punishments
may range from imprisonment for not less than one year to not more
than 10 years.
Comparative
analysis of whistleblower's protection and rewards mechanisms
Whistleblower's
protection. Table 18 shows some of the mechanisms for protecting
whistleblowers, to wit:
designated
public authority's obligation to protect the welfare of
whistleblowers;
protection
from job termination for making a protected whistleblowing;
penalties
for those who cause any disadvantageous treatment of whistleblowers;
right
of whistleblowers to avail of legal remedies to prevent retaliation;
giving
preference to whistleblower's request for work transfer;
confidentiality
of whistleblower's identity and subject of his/her disclosure;
legal
immunity (or mitigation of culpability) when making a protected
disclosure;
Table
18
Whistleblower's
protection mechanisms
(Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States)
|
Whistleblower’s
protection mechanisms
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
UK
|
US
|
|
Nullification
of employee dismissal for making a protected disclosure
|

|

|
|

|

|
|
|
Penalties
and legal remedies for retaliation and any disadvantageous
treatment of whistleblowers: imprisonment and disciplinary
actions for those who retaliate against whistleblowers; right to
apply to interim order to prevent dismissal; obligation of public
authority to prevent and investigate disadvantageous treatment
|

|

|

|
|

|

|
|
Establishment
of reasonable procedures among public sector entities to protect
public officers from reprisals
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
Penalties
for public officers who disclose confidential information about
the whistleblower's disclosure and identity
|
|

|

|

|

|

|
|
Police
protection for the whistleblower and his/her family ; physical
protection for any person who has cooperated in the investigation
related to a whistleblower's disclosure
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Legal
immunity and mitigation of culpability when making a protected
disclosure; protection from defamation suits; no breach of duty
of confidentiality
|
|

|

|

|
|
|
|
No
breach of duty of confidentiality when making a protected
disclosure; gagging clauses void
|
|

|

|

|

|
|
|
Preference
in work transfers; right to appeal to the Public Service
Commissioner for transfer for work to remove the danger of
reprisals
|
|
|

|
|
|

|
The
whistleblowing laws reviewed reveals at least four aspects in
existing practices to protect and support whistleblowers.
Mandating
whistleblower's protection as a societal/organization obligation;
Establishing
the rights of whistleblowers as protection against retaliation;
Preventing
any disadvantageous treatment of whistleblowers in the workplace;
Providing
physical protection to the whistleblower and his family.
A
few specific examples further clarify and illustrate these practical
aspects of whistleblower's protection. Article 32 of South Korea's
Anti-Corruption Act of 2001, for example, makes explicit protection
to persons making disclosures, including the witnesses to wrongdoings
and the cooperators in subsequent investigations of protected
disclosures. When these individuals experience reprisals, they can
appeal for the intervention of the Korean Independent Commission
Against Corruption (KICAC) to guarantee their employment and to
facilitate their request for work transfer or reinstatement. When
needed, KICAC can also request for police protection of
whistleblowers who made a protected disclosure.
Article
33 of ACA empowers KICAC to investigate allegations of reprisals and
requests for remedy. Although ACA does not explicitly state that the
KICAC has a proactive ability to investigate, the ACA allows the
KICAC to recommend the conduct of investigations when necessary.
As
part of the state's obligations to protect whistleblowers, KICAC
and its members and staff are prohibited under Article 33 (1) of ACA
from revealing or even suggesting the identity of a whistleblower
without his consent. KICAC initiates investigations once there is
breach of confidentiality, and imposes appropriate disciplinary
actions.
In
the United States, whistleblowers are given the right to make prima
facie case of retaliation as part of the design of the
Whistleblower's Protection Act of 1989. When a whistleblower
suffers from reprisal in close timing with his disclosure, there is a
presumption that the making of the protected disclosure contributed
to the adverse personnel actions.
In
the United Kingdom, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA)
establishes the right of a whistleblower not to be subjected to any
detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, as a result
of the whistleblower's making of a protected disclosure. Detriment
includes a variety of unfavorable personnel actions such as refusal
to promote, denial of pay raises, relocations and denial of training.
The law also specifies that it is unlawful to dismiss an employee
"principally" because he made a protected disclosure.
Whistleblower's
rewards. The idea of granting rewards to encourage
whistleblowing is institutionalized only in South Korea's
Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. It is not explicit in the whistleblowing
laws in Japan, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United
States (see Table 19).
In
South Korea, when whistleblowing leads to financial gain or
cost-savings to the national treasury, an estimated two (2) to 10 %
of such benefits or a maximum of 200 million won (160,000 US Dollars)
goes back to the whistleblower as a form of reward. There are
exceptions, however. A public official who reports an act of
corruption in connection with his duties may not eligible for the
reward.
Table
19 Mechanisms of whistleblower's rewards
(Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States)
|
Rewards/incentives
for whistleblowers
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
UK
|
US
|
|
When
whistleblowing brings financial benefits, prevents financial
damage to a public organization, or serves the public interest,
the lead public authority may recommend an award for the
whistleblower
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Public
official who reports an act of corruption in connection with
his/her duties may not be eligible for the reward
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Lead
public authority on whistleblowing shall establish a reward's
deliberation board to deliberate on and resolve matters
concerning the payment of financial reward or compensation
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Reward's
deliberation body shall deliberate on and resolve matters
concerning 1) the requirements for the payment of financial
reward and compensation, 2) the amount of financial reward and
compensation to be paid, 3) other matters related to the payment
of financial reward and compensation
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Upon
receipt of an application for compensation, the lead public
authority shall determine whether to pay such compensation within
90 days of the date of the application
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Lead
public authority notifies the applicant immediately if it decides
to pay the compensation
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
The
Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 mandates the KICAC to establish a Rewards
Deliberations Board to formulate rules related to requirements and
procedures for getting rewards, decide whether rewards should be
given to a whistleblower, and determine the amount of the reward.
Comparative
analysis of whistleblowing channels and procedures
Internal
channels. The channels or routes of disclosures are almost always
prescribed by the whistleblowing laws reviewed. Generally, the laws
express preference for using internal channels for whistleblowing.
However, they also prescribe the use of external channels under
certain conditions.
The
internal channels could either be designated persons or offices
within an organization. They include the business entities
themselves, the manager or employer, or specified persons (including
the Chief Executive Officer) within public agencies. In Australia,
whistleblowing to the relevant public agency is required when the one
involved in the wrongdoing is an officer or employee of the agency
concerned. When the accused is a legislator, a disclosure of
wrongdoing can be submitted to the Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly (Australia).
In
New Zealand, disclosures of wrongdoing must be done in accordance
with internal procedures established by and published in the
organization. A whistleblower in New Zealand can blow the whistle
directly to the head of the organization when there are no
established internal procedures and when he believes that the
complaint recipient is involved in the wrongdoing.
Table
19 Prescribed whistleblowing channels
|
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
UK
|
US
|
|
Internal
channels and procedures
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Business
entities
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A
disclosure in good faith to a manager or the employer will be
protected if the whistleblower has a reasonable suspicion that the
malpractice has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Always
to specified persons within the public agency; specified persons
may include the Chief Executive Officer
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
Relevant
public agency when the disclosure relates to an officer or
employee of the agency
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly when the disclosure relates to a
member of the assembly
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
In
accordance with internal procedures; an employee must disclose
information in a manner provided by internal procedures
established by and published in the organization, for receiving
and dealing with information about serious wrongdoing
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
Disclosures
may be made to head of an organization in certain circumstances:
1) no internal procedures established and published in handling
whistleblower's disclosures; 2) when the whistleblower believes
that the prescribed complaint-recipient is involved in the
wrongdoing or the accused can influence the complaint-recipient by
reason of their association or relationship;
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
External
channels and procedures
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lead
public authority designated by law when the disclosure relates to
a member of a municipal council, the Chief Commissioner of Police,
or members of the police force
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
The
Cabinet office
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Board
of Audit and Investigation
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
Any
public agency or staff member permitted by law to independently
exercise his/her authority
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Local
governments
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disclosures
to external authority is allowed when the head of the organization
is or may be involved in the serious wrongdoing alleged in the
disclosure
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
When
the immediate disclosure to an appropriate external authority is
justified because of the urgency of the matter to which the
disclosure relates or some other exceptional circumstances
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
When
there has been no action or recommended action on the matter
within 20 days after the date on which the disclosure was made
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
Protects
disclosures made in good faith to prescribed bodies, where the
whistleblower reasonably believes that the information and any
allegation in its are substantially true
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
Wider
disclosures to the police, the media, legislators, and
non-prescribed regulators are protected if, in addition to the
tests for regulatory disclosures, they are reasonable in all the
circumstances and they meet one of the three preconditions: 1) not
made for personal gain; 2)whistleblower reasonably believes that
he would be victimized if he raised the matter internally or with
a prescribed regulator; 3) whistleblower reasonably believes that
a cover-up was likely and there is no prescribed regulator; 4)
whistleblower had already raised the matter internally or with a
prescribed regulator
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
External
channels. The laws allow the use of external channels such as
Members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers, the Ombudsman, other public
agencies, and the media. In Australia, whistleblowing to external
channels such as the Ombudsman is prescribed when a disclosure
relates to a member of a municipal council, the Chief Commissioner of
Police, or members of the police force.
In
New Zealand, external whistleblowing is allowed when the
whistleblower believes that the head of the agency is involved in the
serious wrongdoing alleged in a disclosure. In addition, it is
protected when the whistleblower believes that the matter is serious
or urgent. The failure of the organization to act or recommend action
within 20 days on any disclosure also makes external whistleblowing
legitimate.
In
the UK, wider disclosures to external channels are protected when one
of the following conditions are met: the whistleblowing is not made
for personal gain; there is reasonable belief of possible
victimization when internal whistleblowing is used; when there is
reasonable belief about a possible cover-up; when the matter has been
raised internally but no official action has been undertaken within
the prescribed time frame.
The
US WPA does not require a whistleblower to make his disclosure
through any particular channel to secure state protection. With some
exceptions such as national security information, an employee is
protected regardless of the channel he used in disclosing information
about a wrongdoing. State protection may even extend to
whistleblowers who take their allegations to the media.
Procedures
for handling disclosures. Designated entities use prescribed
procedures in handling disclosures of wrongdoing. In Australia, for
example, a public body is required to keep proper records of any
disclosure that it receives. Within 45 days from receipt of a
disclosure, it needs to determine whether it is a "protected
disclosure" or not. Within 14 days from making the decision to
confer a protected-disclosure status or not, a public body must
notify the whistleblower about the decision. It must also provide
updates to the whistleblower on the official actions taken on the
disclosure and their results. In Japan, even private sector
organizations are required to notify the whistleblower that actions
have been taken to address a wrongdoing reported internally.
In
the US, public agencies are required to produce a report on the
results of the investigations on disclosures of wrongdoing. The
report, which must be signed by the head of the agency, must include
a summary of evidence obtained in the course of the investigation;
listing of any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; and
description of the action taken or planned as a result of the
investigation such as changes in agency rules, regulations,
practices;
Table
20 Handling whistleblower's disclosures
|
|
Jap
|
SK
|
Aus
|
US
|
|
Disclosures
made to public bodies
|
|
|
|
|
|
Determine
within 45 days whether the disclosure qualifies as a protected
disclosure; afterwards, notify whistleblower within 14 days if
disclosure is a protected disclosure; anonymous whistleblower
need not be notified
|
|
|

|
|
|
Refer
a disclosure to the lead public authority for determination
whether it is a public interest disclosure
|
|
|

|
|
|
Keep
proper records about disclosures; information about public
interest disclosures must be submitted to the legislature in an
annual report
|
|
|

|
|
|
Notify
whistleblowers about the actions taken on the disclosure and
their results
|
|
|

|
|
|
Report
on the results of the investigation must be signed by the head of
the agency and shall include, among others, 1) summary of
evidence obtained from the investigation; 2) listing of any
violation or apparent violation of any law, rule or regulation;
3) description of any action taken or planned as a result of the
investigation such as changes in agency rules, regulations,
practices; restoration of any aggrieved employees; disciplinary
actions against any employee;
|
|
|
|

|
|
Complainant
may submit comments to the Special Counsel on the agency report
within 15 days from receipt of the copy of the report
|
|
|
|

|
|
Private
sector organization notifies whistleblower, without delay, that
measures have been taken to correct a reported wrongdoing
|

|
|
|
|
|
Disclosures
made to lead public authority
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upon
receipt of a disclosure, gather necessary details from the
whistleblower: name, address, occupation, details and purpose of
the report; lead public authority must determine within
reasonable time if a disclosure is a protected disclosure
|
|

|

|

|
|
Provide
procedures for investigation; notify whistleblower about the
investigation; investigation to be conducted in private; hearing
is not required; lead public authority determines whether any
person needs legal representation
|
|
|

|
|
|
Lead
public authority notifies the whistleblower that his/her
disclosure is considered a protected disclosure
|
|
|

|
|
|
Require
whistleblower to submit supporting evidence necessary to
ascertain the truth of the allegations
|
|

|
|
|
|
Refer
a disclosure of wrongdoing to an investigative agency;
investigating organization shall complete its inspection,
investigation or examination of a case within 60 days from
receipt of the case; require public agency to investigate the
disclosure
|
|

|
|

|
|
Lead
public authority can forward results of the investigation to
Congress, the President, and other higher authorities
|
|
|
|

|
|
When
the agency failed to submit the required report, forward o the
President, the congressional committees a copy of the information
transmitted to the agency head together with the comments that
noting the failure of the agency head to file the required report
|
|
|
|

|
|
Determine
whether the report on the results of the investigation is
reasonable or contains the information required in the law
|
|
|
|

|
|
Investigating
organization updates lead public authority within 10 days from
its completion of the investigation;
|
|

|
|
|
|
lead
public authority can ask the investigating organization to
explain results of investigation; lead public authority can
require re-investigation when results are deemed inadequate
|
|

|
|
|
|
Lead
public authority notifies whistleblower of the results of the
investigation; whistleblower can raise objections to the findings
of the investigation
|
|

|
|
|
|
Separate
procedures for handling disclosures with national security
implications
|
|

|
|
|
Public
authorities such as the Office of the Ombudsman handled disclosures
using prescribed procedures. In South Korea, Australia and the United
States, public authorities gather necessary details (name of
whistleblower, reason for disclosure, etc) to validate the
allegations contained in a disclosure. Within a reasonable time,
these public authorities also need to determine whether a disclosure
is protected by law or not.
In
Australia, there is clear requirement for whistleblower notification
on the conduct and results of investigations. Investigations are done
in private, with the Ombudsman deciding whether a person investigated
needs legal representation during an investigation.
In
South Korea, there are two key categories of procedures for handling
disclosures:
When
a high-ranking public official is involved, the Korean Independent
Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) will receive and confirm the
facts of the disclosure. If KICAC substantiates the materials facts
about the disclosure, it files a complaint against the official with
the Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO). PPO will investigate and
notify KICAC of the results. KICAC may apply for adjudication with
the High Court, if the PPO's findings merit such action. KICAC
then notifies the person making the disclosure of the actions taken.
When
a non-high ranking public official is involved, the KICAC will refer
the substantiated disclosure to the relevant investigative body. The
investigating agency needs to complete the investigation within 60
days. The investigative body notifies KICAC and the government
office involved about the results of the investigation. KICAC may
ask for a reinvestigation if it is not satisfied with the results.
Again, it notifies the whistleblowers about the actions taken on the
disclosure and the results.
KICAC
uses trace logs on investigation records and standardized
investigation process. It also observes confidentiality of the
investigation process to safeguard the reputations of the persons
involved. Overall, the design of South Korea's Anti-Corruption Act
is meant to encourage direct disclosures to KICAC. The rationale for
encouraging external reporting direct to KICAC is to "reinforce
horizontal and bottom-up administrative responsibility and prevent
civil servant corruption".
2.2.7
Comparative analysis of whistleblowing official support structures
and programs
Support
structures. Support structures are vital to the effectiveness and
success of whistleblowing legislation. They are the main instruments
for concretizing legislative mandates for whistleblower's
protection. Theoretically, the more powerful these support structures
are, the more effective is whistleblowing as an instrument for
correcting or terminating corrupt practices and other forms of
wrongdoing.
Several
support structures can be clearly identified from the whistleblowing
laws reviewed (Table 21). Among these are:
Lead
public authorities in-charge of whistleblowing policy;
Public
and private sector organizations serving as channels and
complaint-recipients;
Political
parties;
Public
officials and employees;
Citizens
in general
The
whistleblowing laws strengthen these support structures using several
key approaches. For lead support structures such as the Office of the
Ombudsman, the whistleblowing laws make it mandatory to investigate
"protected disclosures". For public and private sector
organizations, the laws in some jurisdictions mandate it as their
duty to prevent corruption, investigate disclosures of wrongdoing,
establish procedures for whistleblowing and for handling disclosures
of wrongdoing, and notify whistleblowers of official or
organizational actions taken on the disclosures.
In
South Korea, political parties, as support structures for
whistleblowing against corruption, are encouraged to create a clean
and transparent election culture. Citizens are also encouraged to
cooperate in the government's anti-corruption programs.
To
strengthen these support structures for whistleblowing, the various
laws mandate the performance of certain duties and responsibilities.
In the case of South Korea, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2001
establishes the Korean Independent Commission Against Corruption
(KICAC) to perform essentially the following functions:
Conduct
studies on corruption and formulate anti-corruption policies and
recommendations;
Evaluate
progress of various public agencies in implementing anti-corruption
recommendations;
Receive
disclosures related to corruption;
Investigate
disclosures of wrongdoing;
Protect
anti-corruption whistleblowers and witnesses;
Operate
a compensation and reward systems;
Ensure
implementation of the Code of Conduct for public officers.
Table
21 Whistleblowing support structures
|
|
SK
|
Aus
|
NZ
|
US
|
|
Mandates
of lead public authority on whistleblowing
|
|
|
|
|
|
foster
a culture of integrity and prevent corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
examine
corruption-causing factors in laws and regulations
|

|
|
|
|
|
collect,
manage, and analyze data on corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
formulate
anti-corruption policies and recommendations
|

|
|
|
|
|
evaluate
the performance of agencies in preventing corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
make
and implement plans for anti-corruption education
|

|
|
|
|
|
assist
civil society organizations in their anti-corruption activities
|

|
|
|
|
|
promote
international cooperation for the prevention of corruption
|
|
|
|
|
|
address
the government's agenda on corruption prevention
|

|
|
|
|
|
receive
and investigate reports and complaints on corruption
|

|

|
|

|
|
provide
guidance on "protected disclosures"
|
|
|

|
|
|
protect
and reward those who report corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
protect
whistleblowers
|
|
|
|

|
|
ensure
implementation of the Code of Conduct for public servants
|

|
|
|
|
|
prepare/publish
guidelines for handling whistleblower's disclosures
|
|

|
|
|
|
evaluate
the whistleblowing procedures of public agencies
|
|

|
|
|
|
refer
disclosures to other public bodies for investigation
|
|

|

|
|
|
notify
whistleblowers on official actions on their disclosures
|
|

|
|
|
|
monitor
investigations conducted by other public agencies
|
|

|
|
|
|
take
over corruption-related investigation of other public agencies
|
|

|
|
|
|
Investigation
of disclosures about Members of Parliament
|
|

|
|
|
|
Referral
of disclosure to Ombudsman
|
|

|
|
|
|
Determination
of a disclosure as a public interest disclosure
|
|

|
|
|
|
Notice
of determination
|
|

|
|
|
|
Investigation
by Ombudsman for every public interest disclosure
|
|

|
|
|
|
Report
on investigation to the President of the Legislative Council or
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
|
|

|
|
|
|
Public
organizations
|
|
|
|
|
|
take
the responsibility of preventing corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
eliminate
legal, institutional or administrative causes of corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
raise
awareness of employees/citizens on corruption prevention
|

|
|
|
|
|
promote
international cooperation on corruption prevention
|

|
|
|
|
|
investigate
public-interest disclosures
|
|

|
|
|
|
establish
procedures for investigating public-interest disclosures
|
|

|
|
|
|
notify
whistleblowers about action related to the disclosures
|
|

|
|
|
|
update
whistleblower on progress of investigation
|
|

|
|
|
|
maintain
integrity and honor; refrain from engaging in corruption
|

|
|
|
|
|
report
to investigative agencies observed corrupt practices
|

|
|
|
|
|
Duties
of political parties
|

|
|
|
|
|
endeavor
to create a culture of clean and transparent politics
|

|
|
|
|
|
establish
a transparent election culture and carry out its transparent
operation and ensure the transparent collection and use of
political funds
|

|
|
|
|
|
Duties
of private enterprises
|

|
|
|
|
|
establish
sound trading order and business ethics
|

|
|
|
|
|
take
steps to prevent corruption
|
|
|
|
|
|
Duties
of citizens
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cooperate
with public organizations in implementing anti-corruption policies
and programs
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In
some jurisdictions, the lead public authority on whistleblowing is
the Ombudsman. This is true in the case of Victoria, Queensland and
other states in Australia. In the United States, however, the lead
authority on whistleblowing is the Office of the Special Counsel
(OSC). The independence of the OSC is assured within the executive
branch of the government. Its head the Special Counsel is
appointed by the President with the concurrence of the US Senate. The
Special Counsel does not serve at the pleasure of the President. He
or she has a fixed term of five years.
The
Office of the Special Counsel follows certain procedures in resolving
complaints especially on retaliation against whistleblowers. In cases
where it determines that retaliatory actions against whistleblowers
occurred, the OSC tries to obtain voluntary correction on the part of
the agency involved. When an agency does not make a voluntary
correction of retaliatory actions against a whistleblower, it
prosecutes the case before an administrative judge. The decision is
subject to review by the Merit Systems Protect Board (MPSB).
In
the UK, the Public Interest Disclosures Act does not provide for any
independent agency of the State to investigate or prosecute
whistleblower complaints. An employee must bring his retaliation
claim to an employment tribunal, which has the power to award
compensation. An employee who is dismissed has the right to seek an
interim order, placing him back on the job, during the pendency of
his case.
Support
programs. Programs that raise awareness on whistleblowing and its
benefits for organizations and the society are needed to ensure
success at the implementation level. In the whistleblowing laws
reviewed, such programs are either absent or not well specified. The
most common programs are those that mandate the conduct of
legislative reviews and the submission of annual reports to the
legislature. Also, in South Korea, the implementation of a
whistleblowing policy against corruption is complemented by the
adoption and implementation of Code of Conduct for civil servants.
To
enhance the public accountability of organizations, the submission of
periodic reports to the legislature by the lead public authority on
whistleblowing and other public organizations is mandated in
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In Australia, the
contents of the annual reports include the current whistleblowing
guidelines and the number and type of disclosures received,
determined as "protected disclosures", investigated, and referred
to other public agencies.
The
annual report mandated in the US WPA includes the number and types of
disposed allegations, the descriptions of recommendations and reports
made to other agencies, and the actions of the agencies on the
recommendations. It also includes the recommendations for legislative
actions in support of the whistleblowing policy.
Table
22 Whistleblowing support programs
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Support
programs
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Jap
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SK
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Aus
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NZ
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US
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Mandatory
legislative review of whistleblowing legislation within two to
five years
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Adoption
of necessary measures based on results of the mandatory review
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Code
of Conduct for public organization employees; penalties for
violation
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Annual/periodic
reports of lead public authorities to legislature
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*
current whistleblowing guidelines
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*
number and types of disclosures made
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*
number of protected disclosures determined
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*
number and types of disclosed matters investigated
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*
number and types of disclosures referred to other public agencies
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*
number and types of disposed of allegations
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*
descriptions of recommendations and reports made to other agencies
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*
actions of agencies on the recommendations
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*
recommendations for legislation and other actions needed by
Congress
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